RECENT CASES.
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION-PART

PAYMENT.-After maturity of a note

the defendant agreed to pay a small sum in satisfaction of the larger at a
different place than that named in the note. Held: That after maturity plaintiff could recover wherever he found the defendant, and there was, therefore, no consideration for the agreement. Foster County State Bank v.
Lammers, 134 N. W. 5oi (Minn. 1912).
The payment of a part is not itself payment of the liquidated whole,
nor is it an accord and satisfaction; for an accord is an agreement. But
there is no agreement without a consideration and receiving part only is
no consideration for an agreement not to collect the rest. Warren v.
Skinner, 2o Conn. 559 (185o); Holloway v. Talbot, 7o Ala. 389 (I88i);
Booth v. Campbell, I5Md. 569 (1859); Bunn v. Gorden, 57 Miss. 93 (1879).
Where. however, the agreement is not a nude pact but rests on a new
and adequate consideration, the execution of the agreement constitutes a
good accord and satisfaction. Warren v. Skinner, ante. But the least consideration in such a case has been held sufficient to make the agreement
binding. Tenny, J., in Hinckly v. Arey, 27 Me. 365 (847).
The statement that payment at a different place is sufficient has frequently been made, Cavanesse v. Ross, 33 Ark. 572 (1878); McKenzie v.
Culbute, 66 N. C. 534 (872), and was actually decided in Jones v. Perkins,
29 Miss. (7 Cush.) 139 (i855). These statements probably only refer to
payment at a different place on the day of maturity.
BANKRUPTCY-OBTAINING CREDIT BY FALSE REPRESENTATION AS A BAR To
DIscHARcGE.-In response to a request from a mercantile agency for a state-

ment of his financial condition, a merchant sent to -the agency a statement
which was materially false. More than a year later credit was advanced to
him by the petitioner, on the faith of a copy of this statement furnished
by the agency. It was held in Novick v. Reed, I92 Fed. 2o (1gII) that the
creditor had no standing to oppose the merchant's discharge in bankruptcy,
under sub-section 3 of section I4b of the Act of i898, as amended in i9o3;
"Obtained property on credit from any person upon a materially false statement in writing made to such persons for the purpose of obtaining such
property on credit."
This sub-section was usually interpreted to mean that the ordinary statement of financial condition made to a mercantile agency for general circulation among its inquiring subscribers was not within the statute. In re
Foster, I86 Fed. 254 (igio) ; in re Steed, io7 Fed. 682 (igoi) ; in re Russell,
176 Fed. 253 (910).
But if the statement was given to an agency for the express purpose
of deceiving a particular creditor, the creditor might object to the discharge.
In re Dresser, r46 Fed. 383 (i9o6) ; inre Pincus, 147 Fed, 621 (i9o6) ; in re
Kyte, i47 Fed. 867 (igog), and in re Carton, 148 Fed. 63 (i9o6), it was
said that any party in interest who chooses to bring the wrongful act to the
attention of the court is entitled to do so, whether he was defrauded by
the statement or not.
In I9io the sub-section in question was amended, to read that the bankrupt shall not be discharged if he has "obtained money or property on credit
upon a materially false statement in writing, made by him to any person or
his representative for the purpose of obtaining credit from such person."
There have been no reported decisions interpreting the sub-section as
amended.
(673)
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BILLS

AND

NOTES-ADMISSIBILITY

OF

EVIDENCE

THAT

AN

APPARENT

MAKER IS AN INDORSER.-In Lumbermen's National

Bank v. Campbell, r12
Pac. 427 (Ore. 1912), an action was-brought on a note reading "I promise

to pay," etc., and signed by the maker below, whose name appeared as that
of the defendant. The latter sought to introduce evidence that his position
on the paper was really that of an anomalous indorser and that he had
inadvertently written his name on the face of the paper.

It was held that

where a party places his name as a maker on the face of a promissory note
before delivery, he cannot be permitted to show by parol, evidence that he
was in fact an indorser.
An indorser's name need not appear on the back of the instrument,
Daniel, Negotiable Instruments, Section 688, but this does not establish the
converse proposition that because the name appears on the face of the
instrument it may be shown that the party was merely an indorser. Shch
an interpretation is a misconstrilction of the text and a distortion of the
cases cited. Those whose names have been signed below the drawer's and
who have been allowed to show their characters as indorsers have been
the payees also of the notes. Quin v. Sterne, 26 Ga. 223 (1858) ; Herring v.
Woodhull, 29 Ill.

92

(1862).

It is submitted that Sec. I7, CI. 7, of the Negotiable Instruments Law is
decisive of this case, though not cited by the court. Merely because the
emphasis is usually laid on the fact that the party is a joint and several
maker, Byles. Bills 9; Ullery v. Brahm, 20 Colo. App. 389. (1905), should
not prevent the emphasis being laid on the face that he is a maker. The case
is interesting rather than constructive.
BILLS AND NOTEs-BURDEN OF PROVING UNREASONABLE DELAY IN

HAVING

186 of the Pennsylvania Negotiable Instrument Law
(Act of May 16, igoi, P. L. 194) provides that: "A check must be presented

CHECK CASHED.-Sec.

for payment within a reasonable time after its issue, or the drawer will

be discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by
the delay." Interpreting this section, in Rosenbaum v. Hazard, 82 Atl. Rep.
62 (233 Pa. 2o6, I91I), the court decided that the burden of proving'such
loss as will discharge the drawer rests not on the holder, but on the drawer,
because it is a matter peculiarly within the drawer's Own knowledge.
Delay in the presentment of a check does not per se release the drawer,
since he is hot a surety, but the principal debtor. Nelson v. Kastle, lo5 Mo.
App. 187 (19o4). It is only when he suffers loss by reason of that delay
that he is discharged, and then pro tanto. N. I. L., Sec. 186. Yet it has,
curiously enough, been held in almost all the states that have had to decide
the point that the drawer will be discharged unless the holder proves that
there has been no loss. This result-is accomplished by raising a presumption of facf that the drawer has suffered loss by reason of the delky. Hamlin
v. Simpson, 105 Ia. 125 (1898); Arnold v. Mangan, 89 Ill. App. 327 (1899);
Nelson v. Kastle, lO5 Mo. App. 187 (19o4); Little v. Phoenix Bank, 2 Hill,
425 (N. Y. x842); Kirkpatrick v. Puryear, 93 Tenn. 409 (1894); McLain v.
Lowther, 35 W. Va. 297 (i8gi).

However, it is sufficient to rebut this

presumption for the holder to show that the drawer has himself drawn
out the funds against which the check was drawn, or that, if there was
presentment, the drawee was solvent when the check was presented. Planters'
Bank v. Merritt, 7 Heiskell, 17.7 (Tenn. 1872).
But in Minnesota, Mitchell, C. J., decided in Spink v. Ryan, 72 Minn.
178 (1898), that the burden of proving loss is on the drawer, because it is
a matter peculiarly within his own knowledge. This opinion was expressly
followed in the Pennsylvania case. Apparently the only other jurisdiction
in accord is Kansas. Cox v. State Bank, 73 Kan. 789 (igo6). Mitchell, C. J.,
points out, however, that in all the cases which threw the burden of proof
on the holder, the drawee bank had actually become insolvent, so that a
presumption of loss to the drawer by reason of the delay might fairly arise.

RECENT CASES
It is interesting to note that while, as between the holder and drawer
of a check presentment may be made at ally time and delay in presentment
does not discharge the drawer, unless loss has resulted to him, a different
rule obtains as between the holder and indorser. Delay in presentment
discharges the indorser from liability as such, irrespective of any question of
loss or injury. Carroll v. Sweet, 128 N. Y. 19 (i8g1).
CHAMPERTY

AND

MAINTEXANcE-ATTORNEY'S

INTEREST

IN

SUBJECT

attorneys and clients made an agreement for the prosecution of certain demands. They stipulated that no settlement of any matters
concerning the suit should be made without full approval and consent of
both clients and attorneys. Held: The agreement was champertous and
void, as giving the attorneys an interest in the subject matter of the suit.
Kauffman v. Phillips, 134 N. W. 575 (Iowa, 1912).
It is almost universally agreed that such a contract, whereby a party to
the suit is prevented from settling the case without the consent of the
attorney, is void as being against public policy. Weller v. Ry. Co., 68 N. J.
Eq. 659 (1905); Davis v. Chase, 159 Ind. 242 (igo2); Ry. Co. v. Ackley,
171 Ill. Ioo (1897).
Champerty is defined as a bargain with the plaintiff or defendant for a
part of the thing recovered in a suit in law or chancery. Casserleigh v.
Wood, irg Fed. 308 (igo2). At common law maintenance and champerty
were pnblic offences, and punishable by fine and imprisonment. 4 BI. Com.
135. At the present day a champertous contract is void. Emslie v. Glass
Co., 25 Ohio Cir. Ct. 548 (19o3) ; Jackson v. Stearns, 48 Or. 258 (igo6).
The defence of champerty is an affirmative defence and must be specially
pleaded. It cannot be put in under a general denial. Comstock v. Flower,
log Mo. App. 275 (1904). Of course the burden of proof is upon the defendant. Hadlock v. Brooks, 178 Mass. 425 (19O1). However, there seems
to be some authority for the position that proof of champerty is admissible
under the general issue. Miles v. Life Association, lo8 Wis. 421 (19O1).
This defence is available only upon an action between the parties to the
champertous agreement. M'f'g Co. v. Cain, 20 Wash. 35r (1898). It cannot be set up as a valid defence by a third person against whom there exists
a just cause of action. Woods v. Walsh. 7 N. D. 376 (1898); Forbes v.
Mohr, 69 Kan. 342 (igo4); Potter v. Ajax Co., 22 Utah, 273 (i9OO).
MATTER.-Certain

CRIMES-EMBEZZLEMENT---DEMAND AND REFUSAL.-In State v. Ensley,
97 N. E. Rep. 113 (Ihd. 1912), an indictment against a county treasurer
for embezzlement failed to allege a demand and refusal. It was held that,
since the statute imposed upon him a duty to turn over to his successor the
funds in his hands at the expiration of his term, no demand was necessary. From that time the possession was wrongful and constituted the
required conversion. Accord: Com. v. Kelley, 125 Ky. 245 (19o7); Cox v.
Delmas, 99 Cal. 1O4; State v. Hunnicutt, 34 Ark. 562 (1879).
The dissenting opinion in the principal case draws a distinction between actual conversion and constructive conversion by mere failure to
pay over, and requires a demand in the latter case. The authority chiefly
relied on is State v. Munch, 22 Minn. 67 (1875); but it is to be noted
that the statute there created no duty to turn over the funds until after
demand.
Embezzlement being a crime of statutory origin, it would seem that it
should be enough to follow the terms of the statute. It appears to be the
general rule that the demand need not be alleged when not specifically
required by the terms of the law. People v. Van Ewan, Ill Cal. 144
(896); State v. Flournoy, 46 La. Ann. 1518 (1894); Com. v. Mead, i6o
Mass. 319 (i894); State v. Comings, 54 Minn. 359 (i893); Bartley v.
State, 53 Neb. 310 (1897).
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A refusal after demand is evidence of a conversion;
but it is superfluous when the conversion is shown
by other circumstances, as by a retention of money which it was the defendant's duty
Harden, 73 Ala. 7oi (1882); Wood v. Young, 141 to pay over. Bradley v.
N. Y. 21 (1894).
DAMAGES-DImINUTION OF EARNING CAPACITY
As
FOR DiSFIGUPnMEN.-In a recent decision

by

AFFECTING DAMAGES

Circuit Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky the plaintiff was the
figurement of her person and for mental pain allowed damages for disin contemplation thereof,
although such disfigurement did not affect her earning
capacity. Power v.
City of Augusta, is Fed. Rep. (C. C.) 647 (Ky.
1912).
That part of the decision holding that the injury
need not necessarily
affect the earning capacity of the person injured
majority of the decisions. Denver & Rio Grande is supported by the great
597 (i886); Western Ry. Co. v. Young, 81 Ga. 397Co. v. Harris, 122 U. S.
(1888); City of Birmingham v. Lewis, 92 Ala. 352 (i89o); Giffen
Lewiston, 6 Idaho, 23 (I898).
The state courts of Kentucky take a view v.contrary
those courts an injury in no way affecting the plaintiff'sto this doctrine. In
earn his living will not support a recovery. Lexington ability to labor and
96 S. W. Rep. 558 (Ky. 19o6); Belleview v. England, R. R Co. v. Herung,
i8 S. W. Rep. 994
(Ky. I9O9).
Upon the question of whether or not mental suffering
arising from disfigurement is an element of damages for personal
divided. Powers v. Augusta, supra, would seem injuries the courts are
to
be
supported by the
weight of authority. Rockwell v. Eldred, 7 Pa.
Nichols v. Brabason, 94 Wis. 549 (1896); Gray v. Super. Ct. 95 (I898);
(19o3); Power v. Harlow, 57 Mich. 107 (1885); R.Power Co., 3o Wash. 665
R. Co. v. Lasseter, 122
Ga. 679 (i9o5). Those courts which refuse
allow the consideration of
mental anguish of this character do so on the toground
that it is too remote.
indefinite and intangible, resting entirely upon the
belief of the sufferer and
not capable of contradiction. R. R. Co. v. Caulfield,
63 Fed. (C. C:) 396"
(Mo. i894); R. R. Co. v. Anderson, 182 11. 298 (1899);
Salina v. Trosper,
27 Kan. 544 (1882).
See note in 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 775.
DE CEiT-PRooF

OF FRAUDuLENT INTENT.-The defendant,
the manager of
an oil company, received a cablegram
from their property stating that rich
new wells had been discovered. This information
was private and confidential, and was iritended only for officers and stockholders
of the company.
Shortly after receiving this news he was pressed
brokers as to whether or not such a discovery had for information by stockation being such that silence was equivalent to an been made, and, the situadmission, he replied that
he had- received no information whatever. A broker
believed that no discovery had been made, acted uponwho, naturally enough,
sustaining a loss, brought an action of deceit against this belief; and, upon
the defendant. The
jury's verdict for the defendant on the ground
lack of fraudulent intent
was sustained in the appellate court. Tackey v. of
McBain, L. R. (1912) App.
Cas. 186.
In several American jurisdictions it has been held
whether a false statement has been made innocently that it is immaterial
party to whom it is made is injured by acting upon or fraudulently, if the
x44 Mich. 365 (igo6); Bauer v. Taylor, 96 N. W. it. Krause v. Cooke,
Rep. 268 (Neb. 1903);
O'Neal v. Weisman, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 512 (Igo5).
The better opinion, however, is contra: and requires some proof of fraudulent
intent, either express
or implied. Pitts. Life & Trust Co. v. Cent Life
(I9o6); Polhemus v. Polhemus, ioo N. Y. S. 263 Ins. Co., 78 C. C. A. 408
-yond question, however, 'that the defendant's motive(i9o6). It is settled behimself; and in fact that his motive is absolutely* need not be to benefit
Charles, 7 Bing. io5 (Eng. 1830); Endsley v. Johns,immaterial. Foster v.
i2o Ill.
479 (1887);
Rothmiller v. Stein, r43 N. Y. 58i (i894).

RECENT CASES
It is submitted that the finding of the jury in the principal case, namely,
that there was no fraudulent intent, arose from a failure to distinguish between the legal meaning of intent as contrasted with motive. It seems clear
that the defendant's statement was made with the intent to lead the inquisitive broker to believe that no discovery had been made, while the motive
prompting the statement was a desire to preserve the secrecy of the confidential information in a situation where silence alone would divulge it. It
is possible, however, to argue that the defendant's intent was, in reality, not
to mislead any one, but merely to avoid divulging any information whatever.
If this view is adopted, then it is reasonable to hold that his words, under
the circumstances, should be regarded as equivalent to absolute silence as
far as he was concerned. It would seem to be upon this ground only that
the finding of the jury could logically be upheld; namely, that his intent
was purely negative, although his words might easily be given a different
inference.
The law of deceit apparently makes no allowance for this class of case
and such findings by the jury would appear to be based upon a feeling of
justice rather than as the result of applying any settled principles of law.
Since these findings were sustained it would seem but logical to say that
there is no real reason why such an inferential deception, necessitated by
the duty of secrecy owed to one's company, friends, etc., as against the
unwarranted inquisitiveness of third parties should not be legally recognized. The rationale of the decision would appear to uphold this theory
and to establish the principle that deceit will not lie when based upon
equivocal misrepresentations, which, although deliberate, are made with the
sole motive of safeguarding and as the only means of preserving the secrecy
of confidential information, when the persons to whom such misstatements
are made have no right whatever to the knowledge they seek to acquire and
who, by their unwarranted importunities, have necessitated the equivocations
by which they are injured.
If this conclusion is correct, it is submitted that the decision has established a new and necessary principle in the ancient action of deceit and
forms an exception to the well-known rule that, in this action, motive as a
requisite is immaterial.
DETI NuE-DEMAND AND REFUSAL AFmR WuT.-A situation more curious than complex arose in Clayton v. Le Roy (i91), 2 K. B. io31. A
watch was stolen from the plaintiff, and some years later it was left for inspection with the very jeweler of whom'plaintiff had bought the watch, and
who knew of the theft. To the jeweler's request for instructions, plaintiff
sent no reply, but immediately took out a writ of detinue sur trover against
the jeweler as defendant, and sent a clerk with it down to defendant's shop
to get the watch. Upon defendant's qualified refusal to give up the watch
the clerk served the writ. The court held that there had been, in fact,
no conversion before writ, so the action could not be maintained. Acts
subsequent to writ may be weighed as evidence of a conversion before,
but if there has been in fact no conversion before writ, nothing which
happens after can mend the flaw.
The fact that refusal takes place after writ is not always of itself sufficient to defeat the plaintiff, however. In Morris v. Pugh, 3 Burr. 1242
(1761), which is followed in Wilton v. Girdlestone, 5 B. & Ald. 847 (K. B.
1822), Lord Mansfield said: "Refusal upon demand is not an actual conversion, but evidence of it. If it occurs after writ, it may be shown as
evidence of a conversion before writ." The proposition that an unconditional refusal is not necessarily itself a conversion, but only evidence of
one, is followed in many American cases. Balch v. Jones, 6I Cal. 234 (882) ;
Witherspoon v. Blewett, 47 Miss. 570 (873) ; Hett v. R. R., 69 N. H: 139
(1897); Watt v. Potter, 2 Mason, 77 (U. S. C. C. 182o).
There is a fine of American cases following the opinion of Holt, C. J.,
in Baldwin v. Cole, 6 Modern, 212 (i7o4), that "the refusal itself is an
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actual conversion, not mere evidence of one." Ball v. Liney, 48 N. Y. 6
(1871); Smith v. Durham, 127 N. C. 417 (igoo); Roberts v. Yarboro, 41
Tex. 449 (1874); these are all cases of conversion by bailee, and this rule
would seem to apply only when the original possession was rightful.
Of course, if the refusal is qualified, not unconditional, it is not even
evidence of conversion, as defendant is then entitled to a reasonable time
in which to clear up his doubts. Vaughan v. Watt, 6 M. & W. 492 (Exch.
1840).
PARENTS TO TESTIFY AS TO THE LEGITIMACY
CHEiL.-In Palmer v. Palmer, 82 Atl. Rep. 358 (N. J. 1912) a husband,

EVIDENcE-CoMPETENcY or
OF A

suing for annulment of marriage, offered to testify that he was not the
father of a child born during the period of the marriage. It was- held
that his testimony was inadmissible to rebut the presumption of legitimacy
arising from birth during wedlbck. The rule of the common law, founded
upon decency and morality, is that the parents of a child born in wedlock
shall not be permitted to testify to the relations existing between themselves and thereby show a child to be illegitimate. This does not prevent
the admission of evidence from other sources.
This was the early rule in England. Goodright v. Moses, 2 Cowp. 591
But the former decisions are repudiated in Poulett Peerage Claim,
(777).
1903 A. C. 395, holding that parents may testify as to non-access. In this
country the rule is that non-access cannot be proved by the testimony of
either husband or wife, whether the action is civil or criminal, or whether
the proceeding is one of settlement or bastardy, or to recover property
claimed as heir-at-law. Dennison v. Paige, 29 Pa. 420 (1857); Abington v.
Duxbury, io5 Mass. 287 (I87O) ; Parker v. Way, I5N. H. 45 (1844) ; Scanlon
v. Walshe, 8i Md. II8 (1875); State v. Lavin, 8o Ia. 555 (890); Comm. v.
Reed, 5 Phila. 528 (Pa. 1864); Egbert v. Greenwalt, 44 Mich. 245 (i88o);
Inhabitants v. Bentley, Ii Mass. 441 (z814);

Corson v. Corson, 44 N. H.

587 (1863),. Where the husband left his wife the day after the marriage,
and the child was born a short time later, the testimony of the wife was
not allowed to- impute the child to her employer. Tioga v. South Creek
Twp., 75 Pa. 433 (1874). This case is on all fours with the Poulett Peerage
Claim, supra, where the testimony.was admitted.
In some states there have been statutory changes in the rule. Under
a statute a wife was allowed to testify as to the legitimacy of her offspring. Evans v. State, 165 Ind. 369 (i9o5). Under a statute allowing
a married woman to testify in any suit, except for or against her husband in a criminal proceeding, a wife was allowed to testify to non-access
by her husband. State v. McDowell, ioi N. C. 734 (1888). But in Pennsylvania a statute declaring that no policy of law or interest shall exclude
a party as a witness does not give a wife power to testify to the nonaccess of her husband. Tioga v. South Creek Twp., supra.
The admissions of the putative father were received, where a married
woman sued for seduction, but the woman was not allowed to testify to
non-access by her husband. Rabeke v. Baer, 115 Mich. 328 (i897). And a
wife has been allowed to testify to illicit intercourse, but not to nonaccess by her husband. People v. Overseers, is Barb. 286 (N. Y. 1853);
Com. v. Shepherd, 6 Binn. 283 (Pa. 1814); Parker v. Way, supra. The
testimony of the wife, as to paternity, was admitted when the jury were
convinced, by other evidence, of the non-access of the husband. Easby v.
Com., II Atl. 22o (Pa. 1887).
When a woman has started proceedings before her marriage against
the putative father of her child born after the marriage, and her husband
joins as co-plaintiff, the testimony of the wife is admitted. Hyde v. Chapin,
56 Mass. 77 (1848); Com. v. Stricker, i Browne, Append. 47 (Pa. i8oi).
If a child is born before marriage the testimony of the wife is admissible in proceedings started after the marriage. Appeal of McDonald,
147 Pa. 527 (I892).

RECENT CASES
EVIDENCE-SECONDARY EvDENcE.-In an action on a lost insurance policy
the insured offered verbal evidence to prove that a lightning clause had been
attached to the lost policy. The insurer offered entries in a policy register
kept by the agent who insured the policy, to prove that such a clause was
not attached. Held: Though the plaintiff can resort to secondary evidence
to prove the clause, this must be the best attainable. A copy, if in existence, must be first offered. Cummins v. Penn. Fire Ins. Co., 134 N. W.

79 (Iowa,

1912).

There is a wide conflict of authority on this point, due, apparently, to
the conceded desirability on one hand of employing a copy, as better than
mere recollection; and, on the other hand, to the hardship of exacting this
of a proponent who may be put to great trouble to obtain such a copy.
In England no preference is now accorded to a copy for proving deeds
and other private documents. Doe v. Ross, 7 M. W. 102 (184o); Kensington v. Inglio, 8 East, 273 (18o7).
In America a majority of the jurisdictions repudiate the English rule
and are in accord with the principal case. Sheddon v. Heard, iio Ga. 461
(19oo); Harrell v. Enterprise Say. Bank , 183 Ill. 538 (1899); Madison I.
& P. R. Co. v. Whitesel, ii Ind. 55 (I858); Phillips v. U. S. Benevolent
Society, 125 Mich. 186 (igoo). Many jurisdictions, however, follow the
English rule. Jacques v. Horton, 26 Ala. 238 (1884); Minneapolis T. Co. v.
Nimrocks, 53 Minn. 381 (1893); Jackson v. Lucett, 2 Cal. 363 (805).
INJUNCTIONs-ADEQUATE

REMEDY AT LAW

FOR BREACH

OF COVENANT.-

The plaintiff leased premises to the defendant, who covenanted that he
should buy beer from plaintiff only. Held: An injunction restraining defendant from buying from any other company would not be granted. Voight
Brewery Co. v. Holtz, 134 N. W. 79 (Mich. 1912).
Equity will not grant an injunction to restrain the violation of an agreement where there is an ample remedy at law. This proposition was stated
and applied in the following cases, where under facts similar to those
in the principal case, injunctions were refused: Hardy v. Allegan, C. J.,
147 Mich. 594 (19o7) ; Steineau v. C. G. L. & C. Co., 48 Ohio St. 324 (1891);
Hair Co. v. Huchins, 56 Fed. 366 (1893).
In a number of jurisdictions it has been held that in this class of
case equity will restrain the lessee from the breach of covenant, even where
no irreparable damage is shown, for while there is a remedy at law a new
suit would have to be brought daily for each repetition of the breach, and
therefore an injunction will be granted to prevent multiplicity of suits.
MARRIAGE-PRESUMPTION OF

MARRIAGE.-Prince v. Edwards, 57 So. Rep.

714 (Ala. 1912), follows the current of authority in holding that where
cohabitation was preceded by a ceremonial marriage which was void, the
continuance of cohabitation after removal of the impediment in connection
with circumstances, even though slight, tending to show that the parties
regarded their relations as of a matrimonial character, and held themselves
out as husband and wife, created a presumption of marriage, although there
was no evidence of another ceremony. Hyde v. Hyde, 3 Bradf. 5op (N. Y.
I856) ; Fenton v. Clark, 4 Johns, 52 (N. Y. i8og) ; Adams v. Adams, 57 Miss.
The following
267 (1879); Flannigan v. Flannigan, 122 Mich. 386 (i8go).
cases are flatly contrary. They may, however, be explained by the fact
that common law marriages were not recognized in the jurisdiction: Harris
v. Harris, 8s Ky. 49 (1887); Thompson v. Thompson, 114 Mass. 566 (1874);
Northfield v. Plymouth, 2o Vt 582 (1848).
Some few jurisdictions hold that lack of knowledge by the parties that
the' impediment has been removed will defeat the presumption of marriage
ordinarily arising from the continuance of cohabitation. Cartwright v. MeGown, 121 Ill. 389 (1887). See also Randlett v. Rice, 14r Mass. 385 (1885).
In Eaton v. Eaton. 66 Neb. 676 (I9O2), knowledge, however, was held to be
of no importance in the consideration of the question.
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Where the relations are clearly meretricious
the beginning, neither
deserve nor regard for legal status of husband from
wife being evinced by
the conduct of the parties, a subsequent actual and
marriage is necessary in
nearly all the jurisdictions. In re McLaughlin, 4 Wash. 570 (1892);
v. Brown, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 625 (19o4); Lapsley v. Grierson, I H. Edelstein
L. Cases,
498 (i848).
NEGLIGENCE-CONTIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF AN INFANT.-In
Schoonover
v. B. & 0. R. R., 73 S. E. Rep. (W. Va.) 266 (1912), the plaintiff,
of twelve years, while throwing a ball over a fence, stepped backwards a boy
the tracks of the defendant railroad and was struck by an engine. It was upon
as a matter of law that the infant was sui juris, and that he was guiltyheld
of
contributory negligence in not exercising that care which is to be expected
of a boy of his age and capacity.
The general rule is that there is an irrebuttable presumption that infants
under seven years of age are incapable of being guilty
of contributory
gence. Richardson v. Nelson, 221 11. 254 (I96); McDermott v. negliSevere,
202 U. S. 6oo, 607 (i9o5).
But some courts have allowed the jury to find
that an infant of such age was guilty of contributory negligence.
Serano v.
N. Y. Central R. R., x88 N. Y. is6 (igo7); McDermott v. Boston R.
Mass. 126 (19o3); Ritscher v. Orange R. R., 79 N. J. L. 462 (igo). R., I84
As to the question of the capacity of an infant between the ages
of
seven and fourteen to be guilty of contributory
negligence the cases are not
in accord. Some cases hold that it is a rebuttable presumption
that the
'infant is not capable of being guilty of contributory negligence. Birmingham R. R. v. Landrum, 153 Ala. 192 (I97); Lynchburg Mills v.
Stanley,
io2 Va. 59o (i904). Others hold that the question of capacity
one for
the jury along with the question whether there was contributory is
negligence
Dubiver v. City Ry., 44 Ore. 227 (i9o4). However, where the evidence
is
not conflicting and only one reasonable inference can be drawn therefrom,
the court will direct, as a matter of law, whether or not the infant has
guilty of contributory negligence. Young v. Small, x88 Mass. 4 (905); been
Coy
v. Missouri R. R., 74 Kans. 853 (r9o6); McGee v. Wabash R. R.,
530, 546 (i9o8); Parker v. Washington R. R., 207 Pa. 438 (I9o3). 214 Mo.
Whether an infant between the age of seven
fourteen is sui juris
is ordinarily a question for the court, and if the and
is conflicting or
doubtful it is for the jury. Payne v. Chicago R. evidence
R., 129 Mo. 405 (1895);
Tucker v. N. Y. Central R. R., 124 N. Y. 3o8 (i89i).
An infant fourteen years old or over is presumed to be capable and
the
burden is upon him to rebut the presumption. Doggett
v.
i34 Ia. 69o (19o); Baker v. Seaboard R. R., 15o N. C. 562 Chicago R. R.,
(igog); Nagle
v. Allegheny R. R, 88 Pa. 35 (1878). For opinion that
same presumption applies to infants even as young as seven years, see the
Simkoff v. Lehigh
Valley R. R., igo N. Y. 256 (i9o7).
PARENT AND CHILD--RGHTS OF SEPARATED PARENTS AS
TO

THE BURIAL OF
THEIR CHimD.-In DeFestetics v. DeFestetics, 81 AtL Rep. 741
(N. J. Eq.
1911), a mother claimed the right to bury her deceased infant son,-whose
custody had been awarded to her, but who, before his death, had lived
with
his father, who had surreptitiously taken him. The parents were
antagonistc. It was held that the burial should be at the expense bitterly
of the
father, in a plot provided by him, within the jurisdiction of the court,
approved by the master of the court, who should supervise the burial, and
see to the observance of the decencies and proprieties of civilized life, and
and
that there should be no other burial in that plot, nor monuments
upon it, without the consent of the court. The parents were to haveerected
equal
rights of access.
The right of burial, as well as the duty, usually rests with the next
of kin. O'Donnell v. Slack, 123 Cal. 285 (x899); Palenzski v. Bruning,
98
Ills. App. 644 (igoo); Comm. v. Susq. Co., 5 Kulp, 195 (Pa. 1899).
Hus-
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band and wife are considered next of kin for this purpose. Pulsifer v.
Douglas, 94 Me. 556 (igoi); Walker v. Weld, i3o Mass. 422 (1881); Johnston v. Marinus, i8Abb. N. Cas. 72 (N. Y. 1886); Scott v. Riley, i6 Phila.
io6 (Pa. 1883) ; Hackett v. Hackett, 18 R. I. 155 (1893). The express desire
of the deceased will, however, prevail against those having a prima facie
right. Scott v. Riley, supra; Secor v. Secor, i8 Abb. N. Cas. 78 (N. Y.
1886). A duty of burial may devolve upon the personal representatives.
Patterson v. Patterson, 59 N. Y. 574 (1875); Tappin v. Moriarity, 59 N.
J. Eq. ii5 (I899); contra. Renihan v. Wright, 125 Ind. 536 (igo); in re
Gray's Est., 9I N. E. 745 (Ind. i9io). And, where there is no other provigion for burial, it may even become the duty of a stranger, under whose
roof the deceased has died, to cover the body and suitably inter it. Rex v.
Stewart, 12 Ad. & E. 773 (i84o); Fox v. Gordon, supra; Scott v. Riley,
supra. Presumably such stranger would also have the right of burial, as
against one more remotely connected with the deceased.
The one having charge of the body does not own it, but holds it as a
sacred trust for those who may, from family or friendship, have an interest
in it, and a court of equity will change the custody if it be improperly managed. Pierce v. Swan Point Company, io R. I. 227 (1872). It is well
settled that, in the event of a controversy, a court of equity can determine
the rights of the parties. Pulsifer v. Douglas, supra.
PLEADING-MISJOINDER OF COUNTS.-In Marley v. Slaw, 82 Atl. Rep. 89
(Del. 1911), the court sustained a demurrer for misjoinder to a declaration
which joined counts for false imprisonment with counts in slander.
At common law a count in trespass could not be joined with a count in
case. Warren v. Fisher, 2 N. J. Law, 240 (1807), because they require different judgments. Courtney v. Collet, i Ld. Raym. 273 (i697). This rule
has been followed in the states where no statute has changed the forms of
action. Smith v. Rhode Island Co., 26 R. I. 24 (1904), except in New Hampshire, where it was decided recently that counts in trespass quare clausumr
and in trover are properly joined. Meloon v. Read, 73 N. H. 153 (i9o5).
But in most of the states, Practice Acts or Codes have abolished the
distinction between forms of action, and in these generally it is permissible
to join counts in trespass with counts in case. In Harris v. Avery, 5 Kan.
146 (i869), on the same facts as in Marley v. Slaw, supra, it was held that
slander may be joined with false imprisonment. In Illinois, counts for false
imprisonment may be joined with counts for malicious prosecution. Mexican Ry. v. Gehs, 60 Ill. App. 173 (1896). In Michigan, under the Practice
Act, and in North Carolina, under the Code, it has been held that trespags
and case may be joined, Bellant v. Brown, 78 Mich. 294 (1889); Bryan
v. Stewart, 123 N. C. 92 (I898).
But in New York, curiously enough, causes of action for slander and
for false imprisonment cannot be united under the Code. De Wolfe v.
Abraham, 151 N. Y. 186 (i896).
For discussion of the rights of a plaintiff whose person and property are
both injured by the same wrongful act, see "Actions Arising Out of
Injury to Both Person and Property," by William H. Loyd, in 6o American

Law Reg. 531 (1912).
ROAD LAw-LIABILITY OF COUNTY FOR CHANGE OF GRADE.-By the Pennsylvania Act of May i,19o5, P. L. 318, the counties were made paymasters
for damages caused by changes in the highways improved under that act.
The amounts paid were to be apportioned afterwards between the State,
the county and the township. The Amending Act of June 8, I9o7, P. L.
505, omitted the provision for damages occasioned by change of grade.
In Jamison v. Cumberland County, 48 Pa. Sup. (1911), it was contended
that the county was liable in trespass for damages by change of grade, under
Art. XVI, Sec. 8, of the Constitution, providing that "corporations . . .
invested with the power of taking land for public use shall make just com-
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pensation for property taken, injured or destroyed." It was held that the
action would not lie. The fact that the county was made paymaster in the
first instance for property taken by the state, did not constitute the county
a corporation "invested with the power," etc., within the meaning of the
Constitution. Lamoreaux v. Luzerne County, 116 Pa. 195 (1887); Wagner
v.Salzburg Twp., x32 Pa. 636 (189o).
Counties in Pennsylvania are quasi-corporations, upon whom duties
wholly involuntary are imposed. They possess no power and can incur no
obligations not authorized by statute. Bucher v. Northumberland County,
209 Pa. 618 (i9o4).
But a county is within- the above section of the Constitution when exercising a statutory power to erect and maintain a county
bridge, Chester County v. Brower, 117 Pa. 647 (1888), or county roads, when
they are covered by the provisions of a statute. But such statutes have
no bearing on the responsibility for roads generally. Jamison v. Cumberland County, supra; Kelley v. Cimberland County, 229 Pa. 289 (igio).
The principal case originally came before the court on petition for the
appointment of viewers to assess the damages, but the petition was dismissed because the Amending Act of 19o7 did not include damages by
change of grade. The court at that time intimated that the action of trespass here brought would lie. Jamison v. Cumberland County, 39 Pa. Sup.
335 (19o9).
For a full consideration of the case as it then arose, see 58 Am. Law
Reg. 39 (xgo9).
ToitTs-LAmmITy OF AN ATr0oRoi FoR NEGLiGEzcE.-In Flynn v.Judge,
133 N. Y. Supp. 794 (1912), the court, following the general rule, permitted
an -executor to recover the expenses of his accounting upon his showing
that, upon the advice of the defendant, such expenses had been charged to
the executor personally and not to the estate.
It is universally recognized that an attorney is liable to his client for
failure to possess such reasonable knowledge of the law, and to employ
such diligence in its application to the matter in hand as is common among
members of the legal profession in that locality in similar circumstances.
He is not bound to be absolutely accurate or exact, or to be familiar with
abstruse or unusual or new points. Morrison v. Burnett, 56 Ill. App. x9
(x894). "God forbid," said Chief Justice Abbott, in Montriou v. Jeffrys,
2 Car. & P. 113 (825), "that it should be imagined that an attorney, or a
counsel, or even a judge, is bound to know all the law." He must exercise
reasonable care and diligence only, O'Barr v. Alexander, 37 Ga. 195 (1867);
unless there has been an express stipulation for a higher degree of care.
Babbitt v. Bumpus, 73 Mich. 331 (r889). He is not liable for a mistake on
a debatable point not yet settled in the courts. Watson v. Muirhead, 57
Pa. x6r (1868).
The early standard acquitted the attorney if he acted honestly and to
the best of his ability, Lynch v. Com., 16 Serg. & R. 368 (Pa. 1827), although
he was held liable for gross negligence. Elkington v. Holland, 9 N. C. & W.
659 (1842).
The requisite degree of care and skill must be computed by comparison
in similar circumstances, a metropolitan standard not being applicable to a
rural bar. Gambert v. Hart, 44 Cal. 542 (1872).
Actual damage must be the result of the carelessness proved, and the
measure of such damage is the amount actually lost by the negligence of the
attorney. Dearborn v. Dearborn, 15 Mass. 316 (1818); Lowall v. Gromann,
i8o Pa. St. 532 (1897).
ToRs-PAiENTS' LIABILITY FOR THE TORTs o" His Crnm.-Where a son
had taken his mother out, at her request, in the family automobile, of which
the son was the only licensed driver, and had negligently injured the plaintiff
in a collision, it was held that the father was liable for the tortious acts of
his son, when done with his authority or subsequent ratification. This
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authority is implied if the act of the son is within the general scope of the
authority conferred by the father in carrying out his business, though he
may not have known of the specific conduct. The use of the family automobile by the wife cannot be said, as a matter of law, not to be in the business
of the husband. Smith v. Jordan, 97 N. E. 761 (Mass. 1912).
At the common law mere paternity imposes no liability for the torts
of a child. Dunk v. Grey, 3 Fed. 862 (i88o); Ritter v. Thibodeaux, 41 S. W.
492 (Tex. 1897); Taylor v. Seil, zo3 Wid. 312 (1899); Tift v. Tift, 4 Den.
175 (N. Y. 1847); McCaulla v. Wood, 2 N. J. L. 63 (i8o6); Haggerty v.
Powers, 66 Cal. 368 (i885). This is true even where the son lives with his
father and is under his control. Edwards v. Crume, 13 Kans. 348 (1874).
But the common law has been changed by statute in some jurisdictions.
Mullins v. Blaise, 37 La. Ann. 92 (i885).
In the absence of statute, however, a liability may, as in the principal
case, arise where the relation of principal and agent, or master and servant,
exists between the parent and child. Teagarden v. McLaughlin, 86 Ind. 476
(882); Strohl v. Levan, 39 Pa. I77 (i861); Lashbrook v. Patten, 62 Ky. 316
(I865). In Maddox v. Brown, 71 Me. 432 (i88o), the father was not held
liable where his son used a carriage for his own purposes without the knowledge of the father. But when a team is used by the son about the business of the father, the presumption -is that he is acting on behalf of the
father. Berhardt v. Swaty, 57 Wis. 24 (1883).
Similarly, under the rules of negligence, a liability arises where the
father has negligently placed it within the power of the child to do injury.
Hoover v. Noker, 6o Wis. 511 (x884); Chaddock v. Plummer, 88 Mich. 225
(I89I), i4 L. R. A. 675; Palm v. Ivorson, 117 Ill. App. 535 (io5) ; Phillips
v. Barnett, 2 N. Y. City Ct. 20 (1882); Meers v. McDowell, ixo Ky. 926
(19o7). Where a father, knowing that his son is committing a tort, makes
no attempt to restrain him, he is deemed to have authorized it. Beedy v.
Reding, x6 Me. 362 (1839).
WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION-AcCIDENT

ARISING

OUT OF THE COURSE OF

EMPLOYENT-The risk of having his hands frost bitten is not incidental
to the employment of a baker's boy whose duty it is to deliver bread for
his master and to collect payment therefor; °and consequently there can
be no recovery under the English Workmen's Compensation Act. Warner v.
Couchman, L. R. (1912) App. Cas. 35.
The clause in the English Act providing that the injury must be one
"arising out of and in the course of employment" has been substantially, if
not literally, copied in all similar statutes passed in this country. It is interesting, accordingly, to note-that the more experienced British courts have
been unable, as yet, to formulate any definite decision as to just how these
words should be construed and the cases upon the subject seem irreconcilable.
The reason assigned for the decision in the principal case is that there
was nothing in the nature of his employment which exposed him to more
than the ordinary risk of cold to which any person working in the open
air was exposed on that day. Shortly after this decision, however, it was
held in Pierce v. Provident Clothing Co., x K. B. 997 (igr), that injury
from traffic on the streets was one incidental to the employment of a canvasser who, with his employer's knowledge, used a bicycle to facilitate his
employment. The cases seem directly in opposition; since the number of
persons exposed to the cold in the first case was certainly no greater than
the number of those exposed in the risks of street traffic in the later decision;
nor was the frequency or duration of the exposure greater in one case
than in the other. Such are the conclusions reached by Prof. Francis H.
Bohlen in his interesting article on Workmen's Compensation. Har. L.
Rev., pp. 532-537 (April, 1912), in which he also points out that it is apparently the sentiment of the trial judge which generally controls, unless the
sentiment of the majority of the appellate court is in conflict. Ibid., p. 532.

